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The Cobblestones of Good Intentions:  
Substantive Due Process and  
Infant Genital Normalizing Surgery 
Benjamin Sweeney* 
INTRODUCTION 
“[I]n its function, the power to punish is not essentially different 
from that of curing or educating.” – Michel Foucault1 
Practitioners and scholars of law must always be cognizant of the 
immense power of law as a tool of benevolence and magnanimity. The 
pursuit of justice does not end at the edge of law’s function as a punitive 
mechanism; furtherance of justice must also address the wounds created by 
misinformed attempts at benevolence. The most vulnerable members of 
society, those who most need the protection of the law, are often the most 
affected by misplaced goodwill. Children, in particular, comprise a group 
that deserves the laws attention, but has little voice within the law. Children 
are especially vulnerable to misguided attempts of assistance, particularly 
where the law does not understand or accept the realities of their lives. A 
particularly stark demonstration of this dynamic is in the choices made on 
the behalf of intersex children, where the State’s attempts to protect the 
child’s best interests can instead cause irreparable harm to the child’s body 
and ability to define and realize their2 own identity. 
                                                            
* Benjamin Sweeney is a third-year law student at Seattle University School of Law. His 
experience is in gender-based and lgbt political theory, which informs his legal 
perspective. He would like to thank the Seattle Journal of Social Justice for affording 
him the opportunity to add to the discussion of intersex rights.    
1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 303 (Alan 
Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
2 Current linguistic conventions do not provide a clear means of resolving the conflict 
between third person singular pronouns and ambiguities of sex and gender. In lieu of the 
binary-reaffirming “his or her,” or somewhat unfamiliar gender-neutral pronouns I will 
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Prior to December 11, 2006, M.C. was a ward of the State of South 
Carolina.3 M.C.’s mother had been declared unfit and her parental rights 
had been terminated, while M.C.’s father’s parental rights were terminated 
as a result of abandonment.4 While under the State’s care, medical staff 
determined that M.C. exhibited “true hermaphroditism,” that is, possessed 
ambiguous genitalia such that a sex determination as male or female was 
unclear.5 Physicians recommended that M.C. undergo surgical alteration in 
order to appear female, and the State approved the procedure.6 The 
operating physician removed all of M.C.’s testicular tissue and removed 
most of his phallus in order to create the appearance of a clitoris.7 M.C. was 
16 months old.8 Throughout this process, Pamela and John Mark Crawford 
were navigating the foster parent and adoption systems, and formally 
adopted M. C. on December 11, 2006.9 Despite their efforts to adopt M.C., 
at no point were Mr. and Mrs. Crawford involved in the decision to subject 
M.C. to this surgery.10 
Years after surgery, M.C. began exhibiting traits much more common in 
little boys than in little girls.11 For example, M.C. chose to play with trucks 
                                                                                                                              
be using gender neutral third person plural when referring to individuals without 
demonstrated gender identity. 
3 Complaint, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-01303, 2013 WL 1961775 (D.S.C. May 14, 
2013). 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; Answer to Complaint, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-01303, 2013 WL 5000957 
(D.S.C. May 14, 2013). 




10 The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, YOUTUBE.COM (May 14, 
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qH4P5PtC4w&feature=youtu.be. 
11 Id. This article assumes several presumptions and overgeneralizations regarding gender 
expression and identity that deserve a more nuanced and detailed analysis. Chief among 
them is the presumption that certain traits and behaviors are typologically gendered. For 
more detailed discussion about the origins, nature and consequences of this method of 
categorization, this author recommends: THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND 
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and action figures, rather than with dolls.12 Today, M.C. is living as a boy 
with the full support of his family and community, but his physical body is 
configured such that it does not reflect his gender identity.13 Medical 
science is unable to repair much of what was taken from him, such as his 
ability to procreate.14 M.C. and his parents brought a lawsuit in May of 
2013 against the medical personnel who participated in M.C.’s surgery and 
the State of South Carolina, accusing them of medical malpractice and of 
violating M.C.’s substantive due process rights.15 
The plaintiffs’ legal theory in M.C. v. Aaronson provides the impetus for 
this analysis.16 Can a substantive due process analysis serve as a suitable 
legal tool to accomplish justice in intersex cases? This article’s response to 
that inquiry is that surgical sex assignment of intersex children is a violation 
of their rights provided through substantive due process. The capacity to 
determine and express one’s identity is fundamentally shaped by a physical 
sexual assignment. The oppression of a child’s ability to identify and 
experience their gender and sex expression constitutes injustice; infant sex 
assignment surgeries performed for the bare purpose of reinforcing cultural 
boundaries should not enjoy the endorsement of the law as an adequate 
interest of the state. The Supreme Court should recognize and protect the 
individual right to freedom from harmful and unnecessary surgery for this 
purpose. Unfortunately, current US jurisprudence does not adequately 
address many of the harms suffered by intersex persons. Where substantive 
                                                                                                                              
GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD (1990); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Trans., Robert Hurley, 1990). 
12 The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 10. 
13 Complaint, supra note 3; The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, 
supra note 10. 
14 Id.; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2-13-cv-
01303, 2013 WL 5000957 (D.S.C. 2013), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/ downloads/case/order_denying_def._motion_to_dismiss_0.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2014). 
15 See Complaint, supra note 3; Complaint, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2013CP4002877, 
2013 WL 2143761 (S.C.Com.Pl. May 14, 2013). 
16 See Complaint, supra note 3. 
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due process does not provide adequate recourse, affirmative legislation 
barring the practice of infant sex assignment should be drafted to protect the 
rights of the intersex infants. 
First, I will provide the backdrop for my reasoning of how the District 
Court should decide M.C. v. Aaronson through a close analysis of the 
relevant contexts surrounding intersexed persons, gender and sex norms, 
and medical practice. Second, I will examine the particular facts of M.C. v. 
Aaronson, including the framing of the discussion by the parties involved. 
Third, I will discuss a just resolution of the substantive due process claim, 
both in M.C. v. Aaronson and in a more general context. Fourth, I will take 
this discussion and the emergent reasoning and apply them to local 
constitutional rights law, analyzing the capacity for protecting 
Washingtonian intersex infants through use of the state constitution’s article 
I, section 3 protections. Fifth, I will consider the jurisprudential limits of 
substantive due process claims, which are, unfortunately, inadequate to 
address the core roots of harm that are evinced in cases like M.C. v. 
Aaronson. Acknowledging this, I will end my discussion by considering 
legislative and non-jurisprudential resolutions to these harms, inviting 
further analysis about how to best further justice for intersex persons. 17 
A. Legal Analysis Concerning Intersex Persons 
M.C.’s story is not an isolated circumstance. Somewhere between one 
hundred and two hundred surgeries of this type are performed each year. 
Though the physicians in M.C.’s case referred to him as “hermaphroditic,” 
modern terminology would consider him to have been born intersex.18 
Though bright-line definitions quickly become problematic, generally, 
“‘Intersex’ is a . . . term used for a variety of conditions in which a person is 
                                                            
17 Sara A. Aliabadi, Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed Infants: How the 
Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy Both Supports and Opposes a Moratorium, 12 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 170, 179 (2004). 
18 Complaint, supra note 3. 
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born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the 
typical definitions of female or male.”19 Any attempt to effectuate justice 
must include an examination of M.C.’s circumstances while also bearing in 
mind the surrounding social, cultural, and medical contexts. Any legal 
solution that does not do so runs the risk of confounding justice through 
poor reasoning and shortsightedness. 
Both in this case and generally, justice requires that we recognize that 
surgical sex assignment of intersex children is a violation of their rights 
provided through substantive due process. Fundamental components of an 
individual’s rights, such as the capacity to determine and express one’s 
identity, are restricted by external physical sexual assignment. Not only is 
the limitation of a child’s freedoms and opportunities offensive to their 
rights, the decision to reify narrow cultural boundaries in the bodies of 
unwitting infants is an act of injustice. For these reasons, the Supreme Court 
should recognize that the individual right to freedom from harmful and 
unnecessary surgeries of this type is protected as a substantive due process 
right. 
Much of the discussion in M.C.’s case involves analysis of gender, sex 
identity, and gender identity in the legal context. Because these are 
academically robust topics, I will not attempt to condense, or even localize, 
all of the theories and perspectives available for analysis. For the sake of 
discussion, I assume certain definitions and understandings with the 
awareness that these definitions and understandings do not reflect all 
persons’ realities. 
While other works are able to provide a more robust discussion of the 
contrast between sex and gender, this article assumes a basic and 
generalized distinction. For the purposes of this article, I acknowledge the 
generally accepted definition of sex as “[t]he biological and physiological 
                                                            
19 What is Intersex?, THE INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, http://www.isna. 
org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). 
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differences between males and females[,]” though the very premise of this 
paper challenges the underlying assumptions of that definition.20 Generally, 
gender is considered the more fluid of the two, as a categorization that is 
“socially constructed by a particular society and ascribes . . . norms to 
individuals within that society . . . [and] is a process that may vary and 
reflects sociocultural expectations.”21 
Both gender and sex are important considerations within this discussion, 
but the topic of intersex rights (and discussion of M.C.’s specific harms) has 
a great deal to do with sex and gender identity. Gender identity, a concept 
gaining more widespread recognition, is widely considered the 
understanding of the self as male or female as measured by social norms 
and practices.22 Sex identity, on the other hand, challenges the immutability 
and plasticity of sex and gender as defined above. Sex identity is one’s 
understanding of the self as immutably, often biologically, male or female, 
“[w]hile gender identity is understood as a cultural phenomenon, which 
may have elements of artificial construction, you’ve ‘got to be real,’ (i.e., 
naturally binary), when it comes to [sex] identity.”23 
In other words, M.C.’s gender and gender identity are relatively easily 
understood as male, as measured by his coopting of social norms. The 
definition of M.C.’s sex is problematized due to “ambiguous genitalia,” but 
physical realities, as we see in his case, can be modified through procedures 
such as surgery. Absent further surgery, M.C.’s “immutable” nature is 
female, and he could therefore be considered female under a classic 
definition of sex. Any definition of M.C.’s sex identity, however, is bound 
to be much more tenuous than a definition of his sex. M.C.’s sex identity 
cannot conform to sex-binary narratives and any attempt to establish a 
                                                            
20 HEESOON JUN, SOCIAL JUSTICE, MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING, AND PRACTICE 127 
(Kassie Graves et al. eds., SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010). 
21 Id. at 127–28. 
22 Id. at 128. 
23 Anne Bloom, To Be Real: Sexual Identity Politics in Tort Reform, 88 N.C. L. REV. 357, 
366 (2010). 
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“male” or “female” label would be categorically flawed. This is because 
sex-binary narratives presuppose a first nature as either male or female that 
existed separately from physical sex. In order to fully understand the impact 
of the law and the social order it condones or censors, we must disregard the 
allure of looking at sex identity through binary narratives and intersexuality 
must be considered a sex identity on par with male or female sex identities. 
B. The Importance of Sex Identity: More Than Just Modified Gender 
Identity 
Expression of one’s sex identity is integral to operation within our 
present day social systems. Vital life events require affirmation of sex 
identity. The experiences of transsexual persons, who express gender 
identities that can conflict with their physical sex, have highlighted the 
dissonance created when one attempts to assert a sex identity that does not 
conform to one’s assigned sex.24 A lack of a societally acknowledged sex 
identity can have severe consequences for an individual including the 
failure of parents to relate to them, alienation from society, the perception of 
embarrassment around the topic of their sex or gender, and fragmentation of 
their family systems.25  
These interpersonal harms are the result of pervasive social systems, 
specifically of rigid narratives about binary sex and sex identity that 
eliminate the possibility of recognizing intersex as a valid sex identity. 
Conformity with binary narratives is, presumably, one method of 
eliminating these harms, but this is not truly viable when the non-
conformity is the result of “immutable” sex identities.26 Many intersex 
                                                            
24 See, e.g., id. at 366. 
25 See Laura Hermer, Paradigms Revised: Intersex Children, Bioethics, and the Law, 11 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 230–31 (2002) (discussing studies that indicate that, despite 
surgical alterations, many families had significant difficulties in processing the fact that 
their child was intersex). 
26 But see id. at 230–33 (recommending that children be gendered, presumably alongside 
a binary gender structure, because we live in a gendered society; the premise being that 
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activists have analogized the repression of intersex reality to the political 
struggles of queer persons to “pursue freedom from normative gender 
constructions.”27 Not only does the existence of intersex persons disrupt the 
tendency of society and law to view the world “in binary terms—of color or 
white, gay or straight,” but it threatens the immutability and naturalness of 
binary sex, a cornerstone of mutually exclusive dichotomies.28 
C. Substantive Due Process as a Means to Protecting Intersex Persons 
In M.C. v. Aaronson, M.C.’s remedy lies largely in his substantive due 
process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution provides 
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.”29 The concept of substantive due process as a general 
remedy to protect intersex persons from deprivations of liberty is tempting, 
given that the jurisprudence surrounding substantive due process limits the 
capacity for pervasive and majoritarian prejudices to infringe on 
minorities.30 In reality, however, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would 
explicitly expand the “discrete and insular minority” categorization to cover 
intersex persons, given other recent, gender-based Supreme Court cases 
dealing with fundamental rights.31 This does not rule out substantive due 
process as a legal protection against the harms that M.C. suffered, but any 
protection will likely need to come from more generalized loci than 
“discrete and insular minority” protection. As will be discussed in more 
                                                                                                                              
conformity to a gendered binary, a reflection of a binary sex, will help mitigate the social 
harms intersex persons are subject to). 
27 DEBORAH T. MEEM ET AL., FINDING OUT: AN INTRODUCTION TO LGBT STUDIES 183 
(Todd R. Armstrong et al. eds., SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010). 
28 Id. at 4. 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously 
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
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detail, the individual rights to be asserted can fall under a variety of 
categorizations derived from substantive due process jurisprudence. 
I. INTERSEX CONTEXTUALIZED 
Unlike populations identified via race or binary sex, intersex individuals 
do not occupy a space in the community discourse. Any discussion of 
solutions must first begin with an understanding of the harms that the 
solutions seek to address. This can be difficult in the context of intersex 
persons, as there often is not sufficient background information present in 
the academic or legal discourse to appreciate the harms that cultural and 
legal systems impose on intersex persons. A level of understanding is 
integral to the empathy and awareness needed, not only to understand the 
harms, but also to meaningfully weigh solutions and their resultant impacts. 
A. Defining Intersex 
Intersexuality remains ambiguously defined both medically and socially, 
and this imprecision creates difficulties in discussing how law and policy 
should assess the needs of intersex persons.32 The imprecision of social 
definitions comes from a lack of universally held standards upon which 
groups can agree. Without a clear, objective standard, the term “intersex” is 
used very generally to describe people living in a state of sexual otherness.33 
The medical definition reflects this vagueness by defining intersex as “a 
group of conditions where there is a discrepancy between the external 
genitals and the internal genitals (the testes and ovaries)”34 and failing to 
                                                            
32 See What is Intersex?, supra note 19 (offering the generalized description of intersex as 
“a general term used for a variety of conditions in which a person is born with a 
reproductive or sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the typical definitions of female 
or male[,]” but acknowledging that definition of intersex can become “a semantic game 
that never ends”). 
33 See id. 
34 Neil K. Kaneshiro, Intersex, MEDLINE PLUS (August 2, 2011), http://www.nlm.nih. 
gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001669.htm (emphasis added) (It is intrinsically unclear 
what discrepancies are being measured against, and without appeal to an externally 
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take into account the significant cultural narratives at work. There are a 
variety of circumstances in which an individual would manifest ambiguity 
in regard to binary sexual assignment, and therefore demonstrate such a 
“discrepancy.” For example, an otherwise “female” infant could exhibit 
male gonad development during gestation, something that is potentially 
apparent by external observation.35 However, the definition could also 
include infants who possess Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, 
where the hormone receptors do not process androgen the same way that 
other XY chromosome (“male”) humans do.36 Because of this definitional 
imprecision there is no definitive or universally recognized figure for the 
number of intersex persons born or living.37 Therefore, intersex births could 
range anywhere from one in 100 births to being a practical impossibility.38 
However, most experts place the figure somewhere between one in 1,500 to 
one in 2,000 births, using the definition of intersex as “so noticeably 
atypical in terms of genitalia that a specialist in sex differentiation is called 
in.”39 
B. Harmful Narratives: Specific Challenges Faced by Intersex Persons in 
Narrative Exclusion 
Intersex persons face a variety of difficulties relating to the restraints 
imposed by medical and social sex binaries. The scope of this paper 
encompasses the specific harms that are imposed upon the 1.7–4 percent of 
the world’s population that are born with primary or secondary sexual 
characteristics that are not clearly male or female.40 It is these infants who 
                                                                                                                              
imposed conception of sexual binary, excludes many of those considered to be intersex 
by virtue of “sexual ambiguity”). 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 How Common is Intersex?, THE INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). 
38 See id. 
39 Id. 
40 Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41 (2004). 
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are the potential subjects of sex assignment surgery.41 An estimated 100–
200 such sex assignment surgeries occur each year in the United States.42 
As will be discussed in greater detail, there is a clear social component to 
the designation of intersex persons as a group that, temporarily or 
permanently, exists outside of a rigid sex-binary. However, for a variety of 
reasons, it is difficult to classify intersex persons as a social group, rather 
than as a class sharing certain medical or physiological traits.43 
Identification with a gender and a sex is presumed, with intersex being a 
temporary condition prior to transition into an immutable and “real” sex.44 
Even where surgical alterations are not performed immediately, intersex 
children are still expected to conform to a binary sex identity, to which their 
bodies will later be brought into conformity.45 
There is very limited information about the psychological wellbeing of 
individuals who undergo this alteration.46 This lack of information coincides 
with the sublimation of intersex as a “real” sex identity. The goal of 
normalizing renders the normalized invisible and relatively disabled from 
advocacy or redress. As a result, one of the harms associated with infant sex 
assignment is the sublimation that occurs; where doctors attempt to “cure” 
intersexuality in infancy there is greater difficulty in establishing 
intersexuality as a legitimate sex identity.47 
Like other areas of gender, sex, and sexuality, intersex has been present 
throughout human history, but this is not immediately apparent. Intersex 
persons can be found in the cultural histories of our own and other 
                                                            
41 Id. 
42 Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 179. 
43 Haas, supra note 40. 
44 See Bloom, supra note 23, at 365–66. 
45 See Hermer, supra note 25, at 208–11. 
46 See id. at 212. 
47 See RIKI WILCHINS, QUEER THEORY, GENDER THEORY: AN INSTANT PRIMER 77–78 
(Riki Wilchins, ed., 1st ed. 2004) (demonstrating that “[t]hrough a series of silences and 
erasures” the political and social power of one identity is transferred to a new identity). 
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societies.48 The impulse to consider intersex as a “new” medical 
categorization, rather than a “natural” state, is more the result of modern 
cultural zeitgeist than objective scientific fact.49 There is historical 
precedent to support an alternative to eliminating intersex persons through 
surgical alteration. Historical sources indicate that medical, legal, and social 
authorities found ways to reconcile intersex persons with the gendered 
environment in which the world operated.50 At a basic level, “surgeries 
[serve] no purpose except to make the intersexed child more appealing to 
parents and to their culture,”51 with the only benefits being collateral to 
conformity with a narrative that ignores an individual’s personal reality. 
Therefore, if the harms of infant surgical assignment outweigh the benefits, 
further harm through continued surgeries should be prevented on this basis. 
C. Medical Treatment of Intersex Persons 
Modern medical practice has supported the normalization of intersex 
bodies through surgery since the 1950s.52 For the last 60–70 years, the birth 
of an intersex child has been considered a medical emergency.53 The 
prevailing medical perspective has been largely based on the studies of Dr. 
John Money, a psychologist who, in 1967, began a radical experiment in 
infant sex assignment. Dr. Money’s study involved Bruce Reimer, an infant 
whose penis was mutilated beyond repair following circumcision 
complications.54 At Dr. Money’s recommendation, Bruce underwent genital 
                                                            
48 Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect 
Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 76–77 (2006). 
49 Kishka-Kamari Ford, “First, Do No Harm”—The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent to 
Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Infants, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 469, 471 
(2001). 
50 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 76–77. 
51 MEEM ET AL., supra note 27. 
52 See  Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Medical and Ethical 
Dilemma: Should Physicans Perfrom Sex Assignments on Infants with Ambiguous 
Genitalia?, 7 Mich. J. of Gender & L. 1, 2–3 (2000).  
53  Tamar Mattis, supra note 48, at 65. 
54  Id. at 59–60. 
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construction surgery to simulate female genital appearance and his parents 
were instructed to raise him as “Brenda,” complete with typical gender 
socializing parenting techniques, a hormone regimen, and complete secrecy 
about Brenda’s sex assignment.55 Dr. Money’s report indicated that the 
experiment was a great success. Brenda, according to the report, followed 
normatively feminine patterns of behavior (for example, the study 
emphasized that Brenda played with dolls instead of trucks) in contrast to 
her twin brother, who followed normatively masculine patterns of 
behavior.56 
Though Bruce was not born intersex, physicians began using Dr. 
Money’s study to support their recommendations to parents of intersex 
children.57 Following Dr. Money’s model, doctors routinely prescribed 
“normalizing” genital surgery, hormone treatment, and secrecy about the 
child’s sexual ambiguity.58 Reflecting the importance of concealment and 
immediate normalization to this treatment method, the American Academy 
of Pediatricians has, until recently, described the birth of an intersex infant 
as a “social emergency.”59 In selecting a sex to assign, physicians consider a 
variety of factors, though none are dispositive.60 These factors include 
chromosomal patterns, future reproductive capacity, and “positive surgical 
outcome.”61 Often times surgeons will recommend that a child be surgically 
altered along female guidelines because “it [is] far easier to make a 
functional female than a male.”62 
Even where the ease of the surgical process is not dispositive, it is clear 
that, when making their recommendations to parents or—as in the case of 
                                                            
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 60. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.; Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 178; Haas, supra note 40, at 45. 
59 Bloom, supra note 23, at 404. 
60 See, e.g., Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 66. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. (emphasis added). 
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M.C.—the state guardian, surgeons project their own perspectives of gender 
and sex narratives. For example, when considering the “functionality” of 
the assigned genital-type, physicians follow antiquated and patriarchal 
conceptions of binary sex roles.63 Specifically, suitable male sex organs are 
those which can, at maturity, penetrate a vagina, while suitable female sex 
organs are able to be penetrated by a penis.64 The stark prioritization of 
“normalcy” as the predominant factor in the interests of the child is very 
clear in early clitoridectomy of children with “abnormally” large clitorises 
that were not able to be modified into a phallus.65 Modern surgeries 
generally attempt to preserve as many nerve clusters as possible, but the 
underlying premise of doctors’ decisions to remove “abnormally” large 
clitorises (which are massive nerve clusters) is that social “normalcy” is 
more important to the wellbeing of the child than nerve sensation.66 
These procedures are all performed with the hope that the child and 
family will ultimately benefit from the child’s smoother integration into an 
assigned sex and gender. However, the hallmark study that supported these 
concealment methods was based on inherently misleading grounds. Over 
the course of his research, Dr. Money failed to publish the troubling signs 
that his method was not working as well as he had hoped. Brenda exhibited 
a variety of male traits beyond the mild “tomboyishness” reported by Dr. 
Money, including standing to urinate and demanding, at age fourteen, to be 
allowed to live as a boy.67 When his parents responded by telling him about 
                                                            
63 JOCELYN ELDERS & DAVID CHANOFF, JOYCELYN ELDERS, M.D.: FROM 
SHARECROPPER’S DAUGHTER TO SURGEON GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 153 (1996) (quoted in Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the 
Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 66 
(2006)) (emphasis added). 
64 See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 66. 
65 Id. 
66 See Karen Gurney, Sex and the Surgeon’s Knife: The Family Court’s Dilemma. 
Informed Consent and the Specter of Iatrogenic Harm to Children with Intersex 
Characteristics, 33 AM. J.L & MED. 625, 633 (2007). 
67 Id. 
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the procedure, he underwent surgery and began living as a man until he 
ended his life by committing suicide in 2004.68 The true results of Dr. 
Money’s method were not published until 1997.69 
Without an empirically verifiable benefit, in terms of synthesizing a 
person’s identity and body with an assigned sex identity, Dr. Money’s 
concealment method could not provide adequate justification for the variety 
of harms that came to light regarding infant sex assignment surgery and the 
concealment method generally. Similar to cultural genital cutting (for 
example, female circumcision, sometimes called female genital mutilation), 
sex assignment surgeries can irreparably damage nerve systems and impede 
sexual functioning or enjoyment.70 Intersex infants can have their 
reproductive functions irreversibly eliminated.71 Finally, even the basic goal 
of integrating children into “normalcy” is frustrated when “the surgeries and 
repeated medical displays of the child’s genitals can themselves be sources 
of a deep and lasting sense of shame[,]” and continued surgical and 
hormonal treatments interrupt their day-to-day lives.72 
D. Modern Responses and Advocacy for Intersex Persons 
In response to increased awareness about the misinformed and harmful 
practices being performed on intersex infants, intersex advocacy groups 
began to organize and seek policy changes.73 The Intersex Society of North 
America was founded in 1994 by Cheryl Chase specifically to address 
medically localized injustices against intersex persons.74 Activists have 
                                                            
68 Samantha S. Uslan, What Parents Don’t Know: Informed Consent, Marriage, and 
Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Children, 85 IND. L.J. 301, 302–03 (2010). 
69 Id. at 303. 
70 See Hermer, supra note 25, at 203. 
71 Julie Greenberg, Marybeth Herald, & Mark Strasser, Beyond the Binary: What Can 
Feminists Learn From Intersex and Transgender Jurisprudence?, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 13, 38 (2009); Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 91. 
72 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 72. 
73 Id. at 72–73. 
74 See, e.g. WILCHINS, supra note 47, at 77. 
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drawn on many political and philosophical perspectives used by LGBT, 
transgender, and queer-rights activists, emphasizing the importance of 
individual identity expression, tolerance of difference, and freedom from 
restrictive social identity narratives.75 
While activists have thus far had some successes, such as in the education 
of the public and of medical professionals, there have not been significant 
legal responses to the current medical standard of care or the rights of 
intersex persons.76 Society and its laws recognize binary options for gender 
and sex identification.77 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of the ways in which 
binary sex structures are represented and reinforced within the cultures and 
laws of the United States. However, certain international family courts have 
begun to reject arguments that sex is immutable in the context of youth 
transsexualism, and are more willing to recognize and tolerate plans for 
intersex youths to acquire treatment for erroneous sex assignment.78 While 
these holdings do not create specific protections against sex assignment, 
they do demonstrate legally cognizable theories of sex identity as a 
legitimate interest; while the binary is upheld, the immutability of sex is 
thrown into question. These victories carve out space for further argument 
and advocacy about the importance of individual sex identification and 
freedom from restrictive structures that restrict this identification.  
These small cracks in the legal and cultural narratives are overshadowed 
by ubiquitous affirmations of natural, immutable, and binary sex. While 
certain courts may be receptive to circumstances in which an individual is 
clearly being harmed by their inability to express their gender and sex 
                                                            
75 Cheryl Chase, What is the Agenda of the Intersex Patient Advocacy Movement?, THE 
INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA (June 23, 2004), http://www.isna.org/agenda. 
76 See MEEM ET AL., supra note 27, at 185; see Gurney, supra note 66, at n.34. 
77 Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 179–80. 
78 See Jennifer Rellis, “Please Write ‘E’ In This Box” Toward Self-Identification and 
Recognition of a Third Gender: Approaches in the United States and India, 14 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 223, 242 (2008). 
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identity, legislative and executive actors continue to reaffirm restrictive 
narratives. One example of this is the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) regulations surrounding silicone gel implants. In response to 
litigation concerning the health hazards of silicone gel implants, the FDA 
declared a moratorium on all use of these implants, except in cases where 
they were being used to reconstruct breasts lost to mastectomy.79 The FDA 
rationalized this distinction by citing the psychological and emotional needs 
of these recipients.80 This exception indicates the FDA’s acceptance of 
delineation between “natural” and “unnatural,” presuming that “natural” 
women would experience an emotional or psychological harm from the 
absence or loss of their breasts that would not be experienced by those who 
were not born into the female side of the sex-binary.81 
These obstacles in the political arena highlight the reality that any 
protection that specifically addresses intersex persons is most likely going 
to come from the courts. Even then, relying on or building on transgender-
focused legal remedies may not be the most effective avenue for change, as 
legal evaluation of transgender persons tends to reassert the existence of a 
sex-binary, even as the immutability of placement within that binary is 
eroded.82 For this reason, protections based on sex identity must originate 
from other jurisprudential loci than protections centered on gender 
identity.83  
Recognizing the unique nature of intersex persons in the context of their 
personal realities and the social narratives that surround them, it is now 
possible to focus analysis on the specific facts of M.C. v. Aaronson. 
                                                            
79 See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 66, at 644–51. 
80 Bloom, supra note 23, at 409. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 409–10. 
83 See id. at 382. 
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II. M.C. V. AARONSON 
M.C.’s biological father and mother both relinquished their parental 
rights, so determinations in the interest of M.C.’s wellbeing were left to the 
State. While he was a ward of the State, medical professionals discovered 
that M.C. fell into the medical definition of intersex in that he had 
characteristics of both male and female reproductive organs,84 both 
externally and internally (this circumstance is medically defined as 
“ovotesticular difference” or  DSD).85 After recommendations by medical 
practitioners, the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) 
approved surgically altering M.C. to create the appearance of female 
genitalia.86 Personnel within the DSS did all the paperwork, processing, and 
decision making.87 
Physicians used extensive surgical methods to modify M.C.’s body. As a 
part of the procedure, physicians removed M.C.’s external testicular tissue 
and the partial testicular tissue on his internal gonads.88 Physicians also 
made additional surgical alterations to encourage the appearance of female 
genitalia, including the removal of M.C.’s phallus.89 These alterations 
effectively sterilized M.C., who would have potentially had the capacity to 
produce viable sperm.90 The Crawfords gained custody of and adopted 
M.C., intending to raise him as a girl according to his gender assignment.91   
                                                            
84 At this point it is constructive to point out that the use of masculine pronouns is a 
reflection of M.C.’s gender identity as male, not a reflection of any inherent maleness 
that stems from sex or sex identity.  
85 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at 2, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-
01303 at 2 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/downloads/case/order_denying_def._motion_to_dismiss_0.pdf. 
86 Complaint, supra note 3, at 49; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra 
note 85, at 3. 
87 Complaint, supra note 3, at 39; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra 
note 85, at 3. 
88 Complaint, supra note 3, at 51; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra 
note 85, at 3.  
89 Id.; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra note 85, at 3. 
90 Complaint, supra note 3, at 51.  
91 Id.; The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 10. 
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However, as time went on, M.C. did not act in accordance with his 
assigned gender and instead began developing a more masculine gender 
identity (measured according to the mannerisms, interests, and play styles 
that are culturally associated with male gender identification).92 As M.C.’s 
gender identity developed more clearly along masculine lines, his parents 
recognized the limitations that had been imposed on him through early sex 
assignment and joined with the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) to file 
complaints in federal and state courts against South Carolina and the 
physicians for violating M.C.’s fundamental rights.93  
A. Goals of Litigation: Allegations of the Complaint 
M.C.’s parents have said that the purpose of the lawsuit is to uphold 
constitutional principles protecting infants from an imposition of “correct” 
sex characteristics and protecting the integrity of their bodies.94 While 
groundbreaking, the legal argument offered by SPLC fell short of an 
argument for an individual right to be intersex.95 
The plaintiffs’ complaints forwarded several theories of why the 
surgeries performed on M.C. were violations of his fundamental rights. 
Rather than highlighting that M.C. was born intersex, they emphasized the 
limitations on his expression of his gender identity.96 M.C.’s parents alleged 
that the defendant physicians and DSS officials could not have known if 
M.C.’s identity would develop as a man or as a woman.97 This argument 
                                                            
92 Complaint, supra note 3, at 13; The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex 
Case, supra note 10.  
93 M.C. v. Aaronson, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Sep. 16, 2014) www.splcenter. 
org/get-informed/case-docket/mc-v-aaronson. 
94 The Crawfords Speak About Groundbreaking Intersex Case, supra note 10.  
95 This foregone argument essentially argues that a person has a right to sex identification 
outside of binary sex. Many of the same personal liberty interests asserted within this 
article could be brought to bear on this argument, particularly since limitation to binary 
sex forms the paradigmatic basis for assigning a sex to intersex infants in the first place. 
96 Complaint, supra note 3 (characterizing the harm as the mis-assignment of a female sex 
upon M.C., and the limitations imposed on him as a male because of surgery). 
97 Id. at 49. 
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acknowledges the lack of credibility in Dr. Money’s concealment method; if 
physicians are aware that gender identity cannot be imposed through 
concealment, socialization, and hormone treatment, then they should also be 
aware that gender identity can develop independent of surgically assigned 
sex. Additionally, the plaintiffs for M.C. asserted that surgery could have 
been postponed either until M.C. was able to make an informed decision on 
his own or until more observational data could be collected about M.C.’s 
gender identification.98 
Both of the complaints submitted by the plaintiffs address errors made by 
physicians, but ordinary medical malpractice does not necessarily 
substantiate a substantive due process claim. The surgery performed on 
M.C. was not subject to a hearing or robust legal determination that 
weighed potential harms to M.C.99 Medical personnel made their own 
determinations and recommendations and the DSS officials consented, on 
behalf of M.C., to the recommended treatment options.100 The plaintiffs 
argued that M.C.’s fundamental, substantive due process rights were 
violated when the state gave its approval for the irreversible medical 
procedure without investigating its necessity.101  
As mentioned previously, the plaintiffs did not emphasize a fundamental 
right to ambiguous sex identity. Rather, they argued that M.C. had a 
“fundamental right to bodily integrity, privacy, liberty and procreation.”102 
The plaintiffs implicated M.C.’s more general rights (or liberty interests) as 
being broad enough to protect his particular vulnerabilities as an intersex 






101 Id.; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra note 85, at 4. 
102 Complaint, supra note 3, at 12.  
103 Id. 
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The plaintiffs also alleged statutory tort claims against the physicians 
under South Carolina law.104 Though the statutory claims arise under state 
law, constitutional limitations necessarily affect the extent to which state 
law can operate to curtail a person’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Many 
of the same harms that are addressed through a substantive due process 
claim, such as loss of procreative rights, freedom of choice, or future 
enjoyment, can also be addressed via medical torts.  
In their complaint, the plaintiffs in M.C. v. Aaronson emphasized the 
deleterious impact of the surgery on M.C.’s gender identity expression. In 
general, there is no discussion in the complaint of any specific rights that 
are tied to M.C.’s status as intersex. This creates the paradoxical situation in 
which the theory of harm is based on M.C.’s fundamental right to express 
his male gender identity. The complaint goes so far as to emphasize that 
M.C. was originally categorized by physicians as male prior to the 
determination that he should be assigned a female sex.105  
B. The Answer to the Complaint: Framing of the Discussion 
The defendants’ approach to the case differs from the plaintiffs’ in that it 
focuses on M.C.’s intersexuality as a justification for their behavior. The 
defendants acknowledge M.C.’s male gender identity, but emphasize M.C. 
as a person of “ambiguous” physical sex.106 Their perspective seems to be 
that M.C.’s “ambiguous genitalia” indicated that things could have gone 
either way.107 The defendants thus frame the case as one where they were 
asked to anticipate the development of a gender identity, and where the 
court is now asked to decide whether the physicians would or should have 
been able to anticipate the development of a male gender identity. If the 
legal argument is characterized in that manner, then there is little 
                                                            
104 Complaint, supra note 15, at 13–14. 
105 Complaint, supra note 3, at 12. (“M.C.'s doctors identified him as male in both the 
labor and delivery summary and the newborn identification form”). 
106 See Answer to Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶3.  
107 See id. 
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jurisprudential benefit to intersex persons as a whole, as body-modifying 
surgery would be appropriate where a child developed a gender identity to 
match their assigned sex. 
Research is still limited, but preliminary results indicate that surgical 
alteration (the concealment method specifically) does not significantly 
impact the direction of gender identity development.108 If the legal remedy 
and protection for intersex persons hinges on whether physicians are able to 
accurately predict the gender identity (or avoid liability when there is no 
clear indication of binary sex identity to correspond to gender identity), then 
intersex persons will only have a legal recourse when physicians can be 
shown to have been negligent in predicting a child’s eventual gender 
identity. This conception of a remedy is unreasonable for the very reason 
that infant surgical sex assignment is unreasonable for intersex persons: the 
formation of gender identity cannot be determined at such a young age.109  
The defendants’ position precludes an appropriate substantive due 
process claim, while the plaintiffs’ position limits the viability of using 
substantive due process in a variety of circumstances. A theory that 
incorporates a wider application of substantive due process would better 
serve the needs of intersex persons by providing remedies and protections 
from unnecessary surgery. 
III. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 
A. Theory of Fundamental Rights: Bodily Integrity, Privacy, Liberty, and 
Procreation  
A more expansive and inclusive set of rights is not only preferable to 
address the specific contextual needs of intersex persons, but is 
constitutionally viable as well. There is no exhaustive list of what 
fundamental rights are protected under the US Constitution, nor are there 
                                                            
108 See Hermer, supra note 25, at 212–13. 
109 See id. 
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finite limits on how those rights can be triggered or exercised.110 Generally, 
however, the Supreme Court has considered substantive rights to be 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where 
the practices protected are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such 
that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right] were sacrificed.”111 
These rights or protected practices must also be “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.”112 If the right is too imprecisely defined or 
abstract, it will not gain judicial acceptance, though this seems to pertain 
more to the application of the right to a definite practice than the wider 
application of a general right.113  
In addition to recognizing an explicit due process protection against 
sterilization, courts have recognized due process rights to privacy, liberty, 
and preservation of bodily integrity as part of a more abstract scope of 
rights.114 Though there are distinct jurisprudential differences between these 
rights, they would operate in a similar fashion in the context of protecting 
intersex persons from infant sex assignment surgery. Approaching them 
together has strategic benefit as well, as there are “[n]umerous court 
decisions [that] support the general contention that on a fundamental level, 
the right to privacy protects an individual’s right to be free from unwanted 
invasion of his or her person.”115 The Supreme Court has also emphasized 
the interconnectedness of these rights, holding that the substantive due 
process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment include the “most basic 
decisions about family and parenthood, . . . as well as bodily integrity.”116  
                                                            
110 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (indicating that the 
Court’s consideration of substantive due process rights “has not been reduced to any 
formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code”) (quoting Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)). 
111 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
112 Id. at 721. 
113 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 833. 
114 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 849. 
115 Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 184. 
116 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 849. 
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The plaintiffs’ complaint claims that the violation of substantive due 
process takes four distinct forms.117 They assert that M.C. has rights of 
bodily integrity, privacy, liberty, and procreation, and that all of these were 
infringed upon as result of his sex assignment surgery.118 These distinctions 
and categorizations are useful in distinguishing exactly what rights are 
threatened by infant sex assignment surgery, but they are not equally 
applicable to all intersex persons. 
First, both bodily integrity and privacy could fairly easily be applied to 
most intersex persons subjected to surgical alteration. Surgery is necessarily 
invasive of a person’s  privacy and bodily integrity. Liberty, a more general 
right, can be elusive in definition. Certainly the right could reiterate the 
liberty of being free from unnecessary surgery, but the liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment can also encompass “the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.”119 Because of the wider potential application of the liberty 
right under the Fourteenth Amendment, it could encompass the right to 
decide one’s gender or even sex identity. Some theorists note that modern 
jurisprudence is becoming considerably more open to justifying rights to 
alternative gender and sex identities in the context of the liberty 
protection.120 However, it is questionable whether the Supreme Court would 
allow for a fundamental right to identify outside of a deeply ingrained legal 
narrative such as binary sex identification. The final right identified is the 
                                                            
117 Complaint, supra note 3, at 77. 
118 Id. 
119 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851. 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (recognizing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects same-sex couples from targeted deprivations of rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, while not explicitly acknowledging a fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage or partnership unencumbered by restrictions); see also, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (holding that people in same-sex 
relationships enjoyed the rights to individual autonomy protected by the right to privacy); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that the state could not specifically 
target non-heterosexual people with a deprivation of rights). 
The Cobblestones of Good Intentions 177 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 1 • 2014 
right to procreation.121 This is, perhaps, the strongest argument put forward 
by the Plaintiffs in M.C. v. Aaronson, as it is the most narrowly applicable 
and unambiguous right.122 In removing M.C.’s testicular tissue, the doctors 
removed any chance he had to reproduce.123 However, not all intersex 
persons share M.C.’s initial capacity for reproduction in the first place.124 
Additionally, this remedy would necessarily exclude intersex persons whose 
reproductive function is preserved. 
A protection centered on reproduction and procreative rights would likely 
have the impact of encouraging intersex surgical alterations to eliminate sex 
traits that do not coincide with potential reproductive function. A remedy 
limited to this right would be under-inclusive, as it would not protect the 
interests of intersex persons who do not identify with their “procreative 
sex.” Emphasis on procreative rights also encourages a perspective on sex 
identity as being limited to binary reproductive roles. Finally, a procreative 
right would exclude those intersex persons who do not have an easily 
observable “dominant” reproductive function.125 
The court order dismissing the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment limited its discussion to the procreative right.126 Though the 
District Court was not required to discuss the liberty, bodily integrity, and 
privacy rights asserted for the purposes of addressing a summary judgment 
motion, the court’s sole emphasis on procreative rights could indicate that it 
is more receptive to arguments about procreative rights than about other, 
more inclusive rights. 
                                                            
121 Complaint, supra note 3, at 71–77. 
122 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the right to 
procreation is a “basic liberty”). 
123 Complaint, supra note 3.  
124 Haas, supra note  40, at 59–60. 
125 See Hermer, supra note 25, at 209–10 (discussing how fertility is only an issue of 
import with a distinct set of intersex infants who exhibit certain physiological traits that 
can be difficult to identify and medically respond to). 
126 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss, supra note 85, at 10. 
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While there may be merit to a more incremental approach to 
jurisprudence that considers the rights of intersex persons, reliance on 
protection from sterilization is inadequate as a remedy. Though there is 
value to asserting generalized and widely-recognized individual rights, it 
would not protect intersex infants from genital-altering sex assignment 
surgery. Even if an intersex infant possessed the biological capacity for 
reproduction and developed a gender identity that “matched” their 
reproductively based sex, they still would be subject to genital normalizing 
surgery that would threaten their future sexual enjoyment and psychological 
wellbeing. 
However, any remedy that relies upon a nexus between reproductive 
capacity and sex identity will be of little use to one whose gender identity 
does not conform to their reproductively based assigned sex. In the 
circumstance where a child does not identify with the sex that corresponded 
to their reproductive capacity, the child would be precluded from any sort of 
legal remedy, while still incurring all of non-reproductive harms associated 
with sex assigned surgery. For example, if physicians had identified M.C.’s 
potential male fertility and surgically modified him to appear male, then 
M.C. would have no remedy under this theory if he had developed a female 
gender identity. In these circumstances we must question what the value of 
procreative capacity is when one would be forced to transgress a 
fundamental component of their identity in order to exercise that right. A 
weighing of these rights, absent the wishes and expressed interests of the 
individual is a hazardous task; any surgical alteration should therefore be 
delayed until the intersex person is able to weigh these interests on their 
own.   
B. Viability of a Substantive Due Process Remedy  
Recent US Supreme Court cases have not only integrated the discussion 
of these various, similar interests in their application of substantive due 
process, but have also been using an approach to substantive due process 
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rights in the individual, sexually non-normative sense to expand rights to 
marginalized communities.127 In these more modern cases, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that the liberty interests of certain individuals were 
protected from targeted deprivation.128 As a matter of definition, intersex 
persons are uniquely targeted by binary sex imposition. Indeed, the nature 
of an intersex person is one who is physiologically differentiated from 
binary sex.129  
On the other hand, the Court’s discussion in United States v. Windsor 
acknowledges the applicability of substantive due process in the context of 
state protections for individuals. This is due, at least in some part, to the 
conflict specific to Windsor.130 However, because the Supreme Court has 
not explicitly established a protection doctrine that would apply 
independent of state protections, intersex persons might be unable to 
exercise this federal due process right where the state has not established 
legal protections to cover them.131 Regardless of the merits of this 
argument, it would behoove advocates to consider the state rules as an 
alternate mechanism of redress. Alternatively, the state rules could be used 
to could be used to expand jurisprudential consideration for groups and 
practices traditionally excluded from substantive due process protection.  
                                                            
127 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,  2692 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 574 (2003). 
128 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; Romer v. Evans, 
617 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
129 What is Intersex?, supra note 19. 
130 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96. Windsor specifically addressed the effect a 
federal statute had on the state-endowed rights of same-sex spouses, and therefore 
involved an asymmetry in the recognition of rights by the federal and state governments. 
The question the court considered was whether the US federal government could create 
legal distinctions that denied federal benefits to same-sex spouses who were authorized to 
enter into marriage under state law. 
131 Windsor was limited to the scenario in which federal law was in conflict with state 
laws in terms of how it limited the State’s ability to protect the rights of its citizens. See 
id. at 2695–96. 
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IV. CONTRASTING WASHINGTON’S INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY CLAIM 
Washington State has no specific legislation that addresses the rights of 
intersex infants, but the State does have a constitutional provision analogous 
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. Article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution reads, “No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law[,]“ which is fundamentally similar to the Federal Constitution’s 
mandate that the states not deprive their citizens of due process rights.132 
State common law has recognized the relative and potential congruence of 
the federal and state constitutional protections, and resolves them 
sequentially where they are both at issue, beginning with the state 
constitutional issue.133 The Washington Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that there are circumstances in which the state constitution might create 
individual rights that extend beyond the scope of the Federal Constitution; 
presumably, this creates an opportunity for protection even in situations in 
which the federal claim falls short.134 The state courts will consider claims 
for protection in light of state constitutional history, preexisting state law, 
structural differences between state and federal constitutions, and unique 
interests the state might have in the subject matter.135 
The Federal Fourteenth Amendment protections could conceivably fail to 
cover intersex infants, but the state constitution is far more likely to include 
protections for intersex infants. If we apply the principles of Windsor, in 
which the Supreme Court struck down federal legal classifications that 
deprived individuals of individual rights that the State was attempting to 
protect, we are left with an odd legal paradox that seems to run up against 
the Supremacy Clause.136  
                                                            
132 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
133 See King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 666 (Wash. 2007). 
134 See id. 
135 Id.; State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986). 
136 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–96 (2013). If the state constitution acknowledges 
specific rights to intersex persons that deserve a greater degree of protection, while the 
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Washington State courts have held that article I, section 3 of the state 
constitution relies upon the same reasoning and interpretations as the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.137 Given that there are 
no guiding state statutes or constitutional common law precedent that would 
indicate a specific state interest in perpetuating surgical sex assignment for 
intersex infants, the state constitution has been interpreted as providing at 
least the same degree of protection as the Fourteenth Amendment.138 
Washington State often considers the state constitution’s protections to be 
more expansive than those covered by the Federal Constitution.139 The 
Washington Supreme Court considers the following factors when deciding 
whether the state constitution exceeds the Federal Constitution: “(1) the 
textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) 
preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular 
state or local concern.”140  
The textual and structural factors indicate parity between the federal and 
state protections, as the text of the state constitution141 is nearly identical to 
the text of the Federal Constitution.142 Although the differing grammatical 
subjects of the sentences establishing due process rights in each constitution 
                                                                                                                              
Fourteenth Amendment excludes intersex persons categorically as an unqualified class 
for protection, then the federal courts may be required to recognize the state protections. 
Windsor differed from this hypothetical situation in that it contrasted federal and state 
statutes. Presumably, however, the underlying principle that the federal government 
cannot specifically deprive a group of rights that are derived from state protection can be 
extrapolated to constitutional interpretation. This discussion is somewhat beyond the 
scope of this analysis, but would be highly relevant in the situation where the court does 
not agree with this paper’s prescription of including intersex persons within the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection. 
137 See King, 174 P.3d at 666–67 (holding that federal court analysis of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was suitable to discussing the same liberty interests protected by the state 
constitution). 
138 See id. at 666–67; Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811. 
139 Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 814. 
140 Id. at 58. 
141 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
142 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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could create legal distinction, Washington courts have interpreted a state 
actor requirement into the meaning of section three’s text.143 Additionally, 
no preexisting state law addresses intersex rights, nor are the problems of 
intersex infants so localized as to be a matter for specific local concern. 
Therefore, the Washington Constitution does not necessarily expand beyond 
the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment, but protects the same rights as 
its federal counterpart. 
If both the state and federal constitutions protect the liberty, privacy, and 
bodily integrity of intersex persons then, even under a limited Windsor 
interpretation, the state would be required to show an interest that rises 
above bare rational basis.144 Given what is known about intersex persons, 
the impact of the concealment method’s early infant surgical alteration, and 
the importance of gender identity, the government would not be able to rely 
on its interest in protecting the welfare of people born intersex.145 At first 
glance, it would seem that the government could articulate a compelling 
interest in preserving binary sex as a socially vital norm or value, but this 
argument fails the targeted deprivation standard of the line of cases 
extending from Romer v. Evans. These cases established that a government 
policy is not constitutionally enforceable when its purpose is to reinforce 
cultural narratives that deprive culture-transgressing individuals of their 
fundamental rights.146 For these reasons, intersex persons like M.C. should 
be able to rely on state and federal substantive due process protections 
against sex assignment surgery. Unfortunately, recognition of this right does 
not completely address the harms suffered by intersex persons. 
                                                            
143 See, e.g., Maas v. Corporation of Gonzaga University, 618 P.2d 106, 110 (Wash. 
1980). 
144 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
145 See Greenberg, Herald, & Strasser, supra  note 71, at 37; Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, 
at 72–73. 
146 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559–60 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 617 U.S. 
620, 634 (1996). 
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V. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE ACTIONS: THE LIMITATIONS OF 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
A. Informed Consent: Rights Held by Parents 
A due process claim relies upon the existence of a state actor, both in the 
federal and state instances.147 The circumstances of M.C.’s case present a 
situation in which M.C. was unable to consent to a surgery that had a 
drastic, harmful impact on him later in life.148 The state DSS officials 
consented to the surgery on his behalf because of M.C.’s status as a ward of 
the state.149 The substantive due process claim relies on the fact that the 
actor who consented to M.C.’s surgery was a government actor. If M.C.’s 
mother had given consent, prior to the termination of her parental rights, 
then the claim of a substantive due process violation would likely not have 
survived the motion for summary judgment. 
The substantive due process rights of an infant are considered to be 
protected when parents give consent on the infant's behalf.150 If M.C.’s 
parents had been the ones to agree to the recommendation of the physicians, 
then the Fourteenth Amendment would not have been available as a 
remedy. Clearly, this is problematic for those seeking to use the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a means of protecting intersex infants generally, as the vast 
majority of parents would likely consent to surgeries recommended by 
physicians. Even if misled by physicians or subjected to direct and willful 
impositions of restrictive sex identity classifications, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is powerless, as it “erects no shield against merely private 
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”151 
                                                            
147 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); Maas, 618 P.2d at 110. 
148 Complaint, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
149 Id. at 1–2. 
150 Id. at 7–8; See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941). 
151 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621. 
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B. Merits of Substantive Due Process Claims in Light of the State Actor 
Requirements 
In addition to protecting infants who are wards of the state, the right to be 
intersex could be used to prevent other forms of government encouragement 
of or complicity in these surgeries; grants, public funding, and other 
regulatory incentives could be attacked as supporting or providing for 
private actions that infringe on intersex persons’ fundamental rights. Most 
importantly, a judicial designation of a fundamental liberty interest in 
protection from unnecessary surgery has a profound impact on the culture 
and discussion of intersex persons’ rights. Many parents agree to 
physicians’ recommendations of surgery in a relative vacuum, unaware of 
the long-term implications or available alternatives.152 Legal recognition of 
a right establishes a foothold for non-binary sex identity within the larger 
cultural narrative. 
If the narrative of gender and sex identity changes, or counter-narratives 
of non-binary possibilities for sex identification begin to emerge, then there 
is greater social impetus and possibility for collateral protections for 
intersex infants. These protections could take the form of altered medical 
practices, legislative protections, or alterations to the cultural systems that 
perpetuate the harms to intersex persons. 
VI. AUXILIARY SOLUTIONS AND REMEDIES 
A. Medical Reform and Medical Torts: Standard of Care Endorsement of 
Surgery Moratoriums 
Some advocates have emphasized the importance of an alteration in the 
medical practices and standards of physicians, focusing on the practices that 
harm intersex persons rather than on legal solutions.153 This approach has 
distinctive advantages over a solution rooted in legal constitutional 
                                                            
152 Uslan, supra note 68, at 71. 
153 See Hermer, supra note 25, at 236. 
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protections. Medical standards of care and internal medical policies, 
ultimately, are the targets of legal action. Additionally, a self-enforced 
moratorium on infant sex assignment surgery undertaken by the medical 
profession could bypass problems of disparities between private and public 
actors. 
This solution focused on medical practices has appeal for legal advocates 
as well, as medical practices can be changed through consistently successful 
litigation centered on medical tort claims.154 Until fairly recently, the 
viability of tort claims was significantly diminished due to US 
jurisprudence regarding medical torts that protected doctors from liability 
where “the medical procedures are consistent with the custom of the 
profession and where they have obtained the patient’s consent.”155 
However, gradually changing understandings and standards have eroded the 
justifiability of surgical sex assignment and concealment, creating the 
opportunity to challenge infant sex assignment as outside of the custom of 
medical practice.156 
As a result of increased advocacy by activists and others, as well as new 
revelations about the effects of infant sex assignment for intersex persons, 
the medical profession is gradually backing away from the concealment 
method as the protocol for dealing with intersex infants.157 There is 
increased awareness and recognition that sex is created, rather than 
discovered, in intersex infants.158 Legal advocates can build on this 
momentum to bring medical tort claims against “hold outs” who continue to 
adhere to Dr. Money’s conception of sex and gender creation by physicians. 
Medical tort claims are at issue in M.C. v. Aaronson’s claims under state 
                                                            
154 See id. at 211. 
155 Bloom, supra note 23, at 393–94. 
156 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 48, at 62. 
157 Kaneshiro, supra note 34, at 68. 
158 Bloom, supra note 23, at 393–94; Ilana Gelfman, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, 
Title VII, and the Reality of Discrimination “Because of . . . [Perceived] Sex,” 34 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 55, 68 (2010). 
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law and it would behoove advocates to monitor discussion of the “custom 
of the profession” in surgically assigning sex to intersex infants.159  
B. Statutory Remedies 
The other promising avenue by which intersex persons can be protected 
from unnecessary surgeries is through statutory protection. Although strong 
arguments can be made to justify and advocate for legislative protections 
for intersex infants, significant obstacles must be overcome. Federal statutes 
could potentially conflict with constitutional limitations that also restrict 
their application to state actors, as can be observed in the application of 
Title VII protections. Additionally, legislative solutions and protections 
create, by necessity, a class of persons to be protected. If individuals are 
required to fit into a specific class for legislative protection, rather than 
allowed to retain an individually vested right, then we run into the very 
problem that intersex exclusion identifies: potential under inclusion due to 
restrictive narratives.160 
Additionally, legislative action that does target the private actions of 
parents would likely encounter strong opposition. Parents would likely 
object to regulation of their parental autonomy to determine the best 
interests of their children.161 Strong cultural and legal customs permit as 
much parental autonomy as possible in the raising of children, including the 
power to make medical decisions on children’s behalf.162 Legislative action, 
though more flexible than the Fourteenth Amendment, could well be 
inadequate for addressing the private behaviors of parents. 
Cultural recognition and endorsement of intersex rights could be far more 
effective remedies than stand-alone formalistic protections, although these 
are less auxiliary solutions to substantive due process rights protection than 
                                                            
159 Complaint, supra note 3.  
160 See Gelfman, supra note 159, at 108. 
161 See Aliabadi, supra note 17, at 191–92. 
162 Uslan, supra note 68, at 308 (relaying, “parents are afforded a great deal of deference 
in making decisions for their children and in controlling their children's upbringing”). 
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they are necessary components of any significant social and legal change. 
Intersex-specific legal protections benefit from collateral cultural awareness 
in the same sense that gender and sexuality protections simultaneously 
propel and are the product of cultural awareness and society-wide 
understanding. The problems faced by intersex persons result from the 
exclusion of intersex identity from traditional cultural narratives; the harms 
they suffer are the result of third parties magnanimously or fearfully trying 
to drag them into these ill-fitting narratives. The underlying goal of tort 
litigation, legislative protections, or constitutional recognition should be to 
address the harms of these narratives and the injustice created by legal 
endorsement of their ubiquity.163 
VII. CONCLUSION 
“Anything that gives us new knowledge gives an opportunity to be 
more rational” – Herbert Simon164 
The law, perhaps more than any other component of our society, holds 
itself out as an institution in which reason and intellect are harnessed to the 
benefit of the misunderstood. Intersex persons, like many other groups who 
are marginalized by cultural narratives, have suffered from others’ inability 
to see anything but their transgression from a restrictive “reality.” Without 
consideration, study, and reflection, the law runs the risk of continuing the 
unfortunate traditions that have harmed intersex persons. Children like M.C. 
should not be chained to bodies imposed on them by the lack of flexibility 
or thoughtfulness of society. It is my hope that advocates and judges will 
                                                            
163 Gelfman, supra note 159, at 109 (“The focus for the dialogue should be whether the 
law can avoid reifying sex categories, or whether it can reinforce them to a lesser extent, 
while still providing protection to victims of sex stereotyping . . . [if the goal is to] 
eliminate rather than reinforce stereotypical categories, then courts should not assign 
individuals, or require individuals to assign themselves, to sex categories [including 
intersex].”). 
164  Byron Spice, CMU's Simon Reflects on How Computers Will Continue to Shape the 
World, POST GAZETTE (Oct. 16, 2000),  http://old.post-gazette.com/regionstate/20001016 
simon2.asp. 
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exercise inclusiveness and thoughtful consideration of intersex realities. I 
hope that with knowledge, and a genuine desire to do justice, advocates and 
judges will recognize that human dignity and respect far outweigh our need 
to preserve convenient illusions.s 
